Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern
Insurance Co., as the insurer of James Jensen,
Judgment Debtor : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph J. Joyce, Ryan J. Schriever, Clint A. McAdams; J. Joyce and Associates; counsel for appellee.
Trent J. Waddoups; Carr and Waddoups; counsel for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Davis County v. Progressive Northwestern, No. 20070997 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/608

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVIS COUNTY,

Appellate Case No. 20070997 - CA

Plaintiff / Appellant,

District Court Civil No. 060904637

vs.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO. as the insurer of
James Jensen, Judgment Debtor,

Priority Number: 15

Defendant / Appellee.
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, PRESIDING

Mr. Joseph J. Joyce
Mr. Ryan J. Schriever
J. JOYCE & ASSOCIATES
10813 South River Front Pkwy., #460
South Jordan, UT 84095

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)

Counsel for Defendant / Appellee,
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co.

Counsel for Plaintiff/ Appellant,
Davis County

CARR & WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

FEB 2 7 2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DAVIS COUNTY,

Appellate Case No. 20070997 - CA

Plaintiff / Appellant,

District Court Civil No. 060904637

vs.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN
INSURANCE CO. as the insurer of
James Jensen, Judgment Debtor,

Priority Number: 15

Defendant / Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE STEPHEN L. HENRIOD, PRESIDING

Mr. Joseph J. Joyce
Mr. Ryan J. Schriever
J. JOYCE & ASSOCIATES
10813 South River Front Pkwy., #460
South Jordan, UT 84095

Trent J. Waddoups - (Bar No. 7657)

Counsel for Defendant / Appellee,
Progressive Northwestern Ins. Co.

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Davis County

CARR <& WADDOUPS
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, L.L.C.

8 East Broadway, Suite 609
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-0888
Fax: (801)363-8512

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND APPLICABLE
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

5

ARGUMENT

7

I.

JENSEN IS LEGALLY LIABLE.
7

II.

PROGRESSIVE IS CONTRACTUALLY LIABLE

7

DAVIS COUNTY HAS "STANDING."
9
The Narrow View Precluded a Determination
on the Merits
1_1
B.
The Narrow View Is Consistent with Section
201
11
(J. The Absence of Standing Prevented Full
Litigation
13
D.

The Appellate Opinion Is Only Authority for
What it Actually Decided
14

E.

The Appellate Opinion Supplanted Judge
Allphin's Ruling

15

DAVIS COUNTY PROPERLY BROUGHT THIS
SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION AND SATISFIED THE
PREREQUISITE TO ACCRUAL OF ITS CLAIM
17

i

A.

The Statutory Prerequisite Was Satisfied

. . . 17

B.

The Statute at Issue Arose out of Equity

C.

Equity Will Not Permit Procedural Disputes to
Thwart Justice
21

D.

The Money Held by Progressive Is Held in a
Constructive Trust

18

23

E.

Progressive's Policy Unquestionably Provided
Coverage for Jensen
24

F.

Determination of Progressive's Contractual
Liability is Ripe

26

CONCLUSION

27

MAILING CERTIFICATE

28

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
pages
CASES
American Polled Hererford v. City of Kansas City, 626 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. 1982)
10
Branch v. Wester Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 276 (Utah 1982)
Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 25 L.Ed. 1004 (1879)

8
18, 22

Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., 56 F.3d 359
(2d Cir.1995)
16
Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444

4, 7, 9, 10, 17

Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture Co., 20 F.2d 295, 297
(2nd Cir. 1927)
22
Estate of Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance Company of Midwest, 2004 UT 104
8
Ex parte Boyd, 105 U.S. 647, 658, 26 L.Ed. 1200 (1881)

20

Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 263 (1999) . . 19

ii

Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983)

13

Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955)

13

Miller v. Sherry, 2 Wall. 237, 69 U.S. 237, 245, 17 L.Ed. 827 (1864)

20

National Cash Register Co. V. Unarco Ind., 490 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1974) . . . . 10
Nokes v. Continental Min. & Milling Co., 308 P.2d 954 (Utah 1957)

2

Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 425 P.2d 769 (1967)

9

Rinderknecht v. Luck, 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App. 1998)

2

Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard Oil Company, Inc., 2007 ND 36
11
Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69

12

Speyer, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. 295 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1972)

16

St. Pierre and Que-Van Transport v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 400 (2nd Cir. 1999)
15
State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994)

12

Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges, 541 F.2d 890 (2d
Cir.1976)
14
Utah Coop. Ass'n v. White Distrib. & Supply Co., 2 Utah 2d 391, 275 P.2d 687
(Utah 1954)
20
Vanderlaan v. Berry Construction Co., 255 N.E.2d 615 (111. 1970)

10

Woodfin Equities Corp. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Md.App. 616 (Md. App.
1995)
21
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
UTAH R. CIV. P. 8

7

OTHER AUTHORITIES
30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89

21

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING IN THE DISTRICT COURT
The plaintiff, Davis County (hereinafter "Davis County"), suffered
property damage to one of its police cruisers. This property damage was caused
by the negligence of James Jensen (hereinafter "Jensen"). Progressive
Northwestern Mutual Insurance Company (hereinafter "Progressive") insured
Jensen and his vehicle, but it refused to defend or indemnify him. Davis
County sued Progressive based on a cause of action created by UTAH CODE
ANN. § 31A-22-201. The trial court dismissed all claims based on its conclusion
that this Court's prior ruling constituted res judicata and that Davis County
still lacks "standing." The appellant is Davis County, and the Appellee is
Progressive, civil number 060904637. (R. 1).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to §
78-2-2(3)(j), UTAH CODE ANN. (1953, as amended). And this matter was poured
over to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to § 78-2-2(4), UTAH CODE ANN.
(1953, as amended).

COURSE OF PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION BELOW
On November 14, 2007 the trial court issued an order granting
Progressive's motion for summary judgment and denying Davis County's
motion for summary judgment. (R. 151). The order declared that Davis
County lacked standing and that the prior appeal was res judicata. (R. 151).
Plaintiff filed its Notice of Appeal on December 12, 2007. (R. 153).

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND APPLICABLE STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
A. The district court ruling was made under authority granted
by Rule 56, and the questions are all founded upon the question of whether
the legal determinations of the district court were proper. REVIEWED FOR
CORRECTNESS. Rinderknecht v. Luck. 965 P.2d 564 (Utah App, 1998)
("This appeal is from a summary judgment, which is granted only when 'there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Inasmuch as a
challenge to summary judgment presents for review conclusions of law only,
because, by definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, this
Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, without according deference
to the trial court's legal conclusions.' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499
(Utah 1989) (per curiam). Accord Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 925 P.2d 1270, 1272-73 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).").
B. Does Davis County have standing under Section 201?
Reviewed for correctness. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201.
C. Did the Jensen I court rule on the merits? Reviewed for
correctness. See Nokes v. Continental Min. & Milling Co.. 308 P.2d 954 (Utah
1957) (explaining that Article VIII, § 9 [at the time] authorized an appellate
court to set aside findings "and another finding made only if the evidence
clearly preponderates against his finding"); UTAH CONST. Art. VIII, §§ 1, 3, 4.

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
31A-22-201.

Required provisions of liability insurance policies.

Every liability insurance policy shall provide that the bankruptcy or
insolvency of the insured may not diminish any liability of the insurer to third
parties, and that if execution against the insured is returned unsatisfied, an
action may be maintained against the insurer to the extent that the liability is
covered by the policy.

31A-22-202.

Protection of third-party claimants.

No insurance contract insuring against loss or damage through legal liability
for the bodily injury or death by accident of any person, or for damage to the
property of any person may be retroactively abrogated to the detriment of any
third-party claimant by any agreement between the insurer and insured after
the occurrence of any injury, death, or damage for which the insured may be
liable. This attempted abrogation is void.

68-3-2.

Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed --

Rules of equity prevail.
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this state. The statutes
establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and
their provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.
Whenever there is any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Defendant Progressive Insurance Company insured James Jensen

and his vehicle. Davis County v. Jensen, 2003 UT App 444,11 3.
2.

Jensen is legally liable for damages to Davis County's property. Id.

3.

Progressive refused to defend or indemnify Jensen based on its

at 114.

interpretation of its insurance policy. Id. at 11 3.
4.

Davis County and Progressive were both named in the lawsuit

against Jensen. Id. at 11 4.
5.

Judge Allphin ruled that Progressive's refusal to defend or

indemnify was lawful. Id. at 11 5.
6.

Davis County appealed Judge Allphin's ruling. Id. at 11 7.

7.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all claims

against Progressive based on Davis County's lack of "standing." L i at n. 7.
8.

Davis County was unable to locate Jensen. (R. 73).

9.

As a result, Davis County did not file any papers in the court

relating to execution against Jensen. (R. 73).
10.

Davis County brought this new lawsuit alleging that it had

satisfied the statutory prerequisite by trying to find Jensen because the law
does not require any futile act. (R. 1).
11.

Progressive defended this new lawsuit arguing that the "execution

returned unsatisfied" prerequisite was not satisfied by Davis County's inability
to find Jensen and that Davis County, as a result, still lacks standing. (R. 10).
12.

Progressive defended this new lawsuit arguing that the Jensen I

ruling precludes this litigation under the doctrine of res judicata. (R. 10).
4

13.

The district court granted Progressive's motion for summary

judgment on the bases set forth above in ITU 11-12.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Progressive holds money that belongs to Davis County. It issued a policy
of automobile liability insurance to James Jensen. Davis County has a
judgment against James Jensen. That judgment established Jensen's legal
liability, and Jensen's legal liability triggered Progressive's obligation to
provide indemnification to Jensen.
This appeal arose from a separate cause of action directly against
Progressive pursuant to what is colloquially called a direct-action statute.
Since this cause of action is new, res judicata cannot apply. Plaintiff has
"standing" because the general conditions set forth in the direct-action statute
were satisfied as a result of Jensen having disappeared.
The application of res judicata requires that the following three elements
be met: (1) judgment on the merits in an earlier action; (2) identity of the
parties or parties in privity in the two suits; and (3) identity of the cause of
action in both suits. The merits of the coverage cause of action were not
addressed by the panel in the prior appeal, the panel ruled that Davis County
was not in "privity" with Jensen or Progressive, and the panel limited its
analysis to tort law without addressing Progressive's contractual duty to
indemnify Jensen by paying the judgment.
Liability coverage is mandatory under Utah law. Its purpose is to protect
innocent third-parties like Davis County.
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Davis County lacked "standing" to
5

bring a cause of action against Progressive. Since Davis County was held to
lack "standing," this Court declined to reach the merits of Davis County's prior
appeal. Since the merits were not reached by this Court in the prior appeal,
the ruling of the Second District Court cannot have any preclusive effect.
Judge Henriod ruled that the condition contained in the so-called direct action statute was not satisfied. The ruling was legal error because the law
requires nothing more than what Plaintiff did. Plaintiff was unable to obtain a
writ of execution because Plaintiff could not find Jensen. The effort to locate
Jensen coupled with the inability to locate Jensen satisfies the statutory
language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201 which stipulates that an action may
be maintained against the insurer "if execution against the insured is returned
unsatisfied . . . ."

6

ARGUMENT
I.

JENSEN IS LEGALLY LIABLE.

Jensen damaged a vehicle driven by Sergeant Gleave and owned by Davis
County. Davis County sued Jensen for property damage. Jensen owed a duty
of due care to Davis County, he breached the duty of due care, his breach
proximately caused injury to property, and damages resulted from the injury.
As a result, a judgment was entered against Jensen in the sum of $17,209.88.
Progressive was not alleged to have breached a duty of due care to avoid
injuring Davis County's property. Therefore, it was not joined as a party to the
tort claim1 which was brought against Jensen. Instead, Progressive was joined
to enforce its contractual promise to indemnify Jensen for his legal liability.
The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "Davis County cannot bring a cause of
action in contract directly against Progressive." Davis County v. Jensen, 2003
UT App 444,11 19 (hereinafter "Jensen I").

II.

PROGRESSIVE IS CONTRACTUALLY LIABLE.

A liability carrier owes indemnification to its insured when its insured is
"legally liable."2 Legal liability is the "trigger" of coverage. Proof of legal
1

Under UTAH R. Civ. P. 8, "claim" is synonymous with "cause of action"
and should be distinguished from Jensen's insurance "claim" that Progressive
should have paid.
2

Liability insurance coverage typically requires a jury trial before its
contractual performance is required because the insurer's obligation under a
liability policy rests on its insured's tort liability and tort liability is determined
by a jury or other finder of fact. Other types of insurance coverage are very,
very different. "For example, unlike damages for which a tortfeasor is
responsible, an insurer's liability [under UIM coverage] is contingent upon
performance of the insured's obligations under the contract. Moreover, an
insurer's exposure is limited by the amount of the premiums the insured
agreed to pay. These features of the underinsured motorist contract, and
7

liability (e.g., a judgment) is the consideration that an insured owes to the
insurer and receipt of that consideration by the insurer triggers the insurer's
obligation to provide reciprocal consideration under the terms of the contract.
Courts never weigh the consideration specified in an integrated contract.
Therefore, when an insurer is notified of its insured's legal liability, it must
immediately perform according to the terms set forth in the fully integrated 3
contract. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-202 (forbidding retroactive
abrogation of insurance by agreement 4 in order to protect third-party
claimants).
When (a) two parties have a contract, (b) the performance due from the
party whose performance is first in time has been provided, and (c) the party
whose performance is second in time has refused to perform, the second party
has breached its contract. The contract is then executory and may be enforced

actions for its breach, illustrate that the insurer does not simply step into the
shoes of the tortfeasor, or his liability insurer, to make the insured whole.
Rather, the accident victim's claim for damages arises out of the terms of her
contract with her insurer—not out of her underlying injuries." Estate of
Berkemeir v. Hartford Insurance Company of Midwest. 2004 UT 104,11 17.
3

Insurance policies are fully integrated and that conclusion requires no
analysis or extrinsic evidence. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-21-106. The legislature
weighed the relative interests of the parties and struck the balance in favor of
the injured third party. See, e.g.. Branch v. Wester Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d
267, 276 (Utah 1982) (discussing the violation of a statutory prohibition
relating to reasonableness of conduct under nuisance per se claim).
4

"[A]greement" should be read broadly in order to encompass omissions
such as Progressive's refusal to indemnify its insured, refusal to defend its
insured and its failure to locate its insured. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-521(1)
(defining felony insurance fraud to include omissions); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A31-103(3) (defining insurance fraud to include omissions); UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-26-301 (requiring prompt payment of all claims to and on behalf of firstparty claimants and guidelines to identify valid claims); UTAH CODE ANN. §
31A-26-303 (defining unfair claims settlement practices and requiring insurers
to implement standards).
8

by the party or his creditors. Progressive breached its contract when it refused
to indemnify Jensen for his legal liability.

III.

DAVIS COUNTY HAS "STANDING."5

As discussed above, Davis County did not bring a "direct action" 6 against
Progressive in the litigation analyzed in Jensen I. Strictly speaking, a direct
action is an action that includes an insurer as a defendant together with the
tortfeasor and disregards the tort-based and contract-based principles and
distinctions explained above.7
Davis County joined Progressive as a party asking the Court to place
ultimate responsibility for the loss upon the one whom in good conscience it

5

"Standing" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. Article III of
the United States Constitution imposes a case or controversy requirement
from which a standing doctrine has been developed. But the definition relied
upon by the Jensen I panel is not clear.
6

"Direct action" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. The
Jensen I panel distinguished precedent relating to actions to recover on
insurance policies by third parties. "The policy contained the usual provision
that a judgment creditor of the insured may bring such a suit." Peterson v.
Western Casualtv & Suretv Co.. 19 Utah 2d 26, 425 P.2d 769 (1967); Jensen I
at 1117; but see the direct-action clause in Progressive's policy:
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST US
We may not be sued for payment under Part I - Liability To
Others until the obligation of an insured person to pay is
finally determined either by final judgment against that person
or by written agreement of the insured person, the claimant
and us.
*

*

*

Progressive's policy, at p. 38 (underlining added). Presumably (implicitly), the
Jensen I panel viewed that clause as a condition to a separate cause of action.
7

A direct action should be distinguished from a declaratory judgment
action and an inurement statute.
9

ought to fall. Equity and the general procedural mechanism referred to as
"subrogation" is not at all concerned with "privity."8
It is true, generally, that one who is not a party to a contract may not
recover for its breach. See National Cash Register Co. V. Unarco Ind., 490 F.2d
285, 286 (7th Cir. 1974) (citing, Vanderlaan v. Berry Construction Co., 255
N.E.2d 615 (111. 1970)). Like all general rules, there are numerous exceptions.
Moreover, the general rule only applies to circumstances for which it was
developed.
One of the exceptions is the equitable doctrine of subrogation which is
usually broadly interpreted to dispense justice. IcL at 286-87; compare Davis
County v. Jensen 2003 UT App at 1118 (lamenting the inequity of the panel's
decision to construe subrogation narrowly). Broad interpretation is especially
appropriate in the context of the statutory contract that the Utah Legislature
required Jensen to enter into with Progressive under penalty of criminal
sanction. 9
The holding of Jensen I was that Davis County "lack[ed] standing."
Jensen 2003 UT App at n. 7. In other words, the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. The narrow view taken by the Jensen I panel, without more,
would tend to undermine the goal of protection for injured motorists and
prompt recovery of losses. The court's holding must be viewed in the context
of Section 201.
8

"Privity" is an uncertain term with no fixed definition. For this
reason, the authors of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments abandoned the
term "privity" altogether. See American Polled Hererford v. City of Kansas
Citv. 626 S.W.2d 237, 241 (Mo. 1982).
9

UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (imposing criminal sanctions, a class B
misdemeanor, for any motorist's failure to join the risk pool).
10

A,

The Narrow View Precluded a Determination on the
Merits

The narrow view of subrogation in the context of Jensen I prevented
adjudication of the merits based upon the Court's determination that it, and by
necessary implication the district court, lacked jurisdiction to consider the
merits of claims made by a party lacking "standing" to contest Progressive's
refusal to pay Jensen's claim. Since it determined that it lacked jurisdiction,
the Jensen I panel declined to reach the underlying merits. I d "It is axiomatic
that res judicata claim preclusion and rules against splitting a cause of action
are inapplicable when a statute explicitly prohibits inclusion of additional
claims in the original action." Riverwood Commercial Park, LLC v. Standard
Oil Company. Inc., 2007 ND 36,1117 (discussing North Dakota's eviction
statute which forbids extraneous claims).

B.

The Narrow View Is Consistent with Section 201

Without more, the Jensen I panel's interpretation of subrogation would
undermine mandatory insurance. But, in this case, there is more.
There is a statute that creates an independent cause of action that
accrues subsequent to an insurer's breach of its contract and obviates the
necessity for a court to resort to equity. In other words, an innocent victim
does not lose the rights that would be provided in equity because the
legislature has supplanted equity with a separate cause of action.
The Jensen I panel's holding can be harmonized with traditional

11

principles of equity, public policy underlying mandatory insurance, and
protection of innocent third-parties who suffer injury. The harmony was
analyzed by the Utah Supreme Court in Speros v. Fricke and its interpretation
of the separate cause of action that arises when an insurer breaches its
contract by refusing to indemnify its insured.
1155 West American is entitled to reimbursement from
Nationwide if it attempted unsuccessfully to execute on its
judgment against Hiatt. Hiatt is now deceased, and all
indications in the record suggest that execution against
Hiatt's estate would prove futile. Nevertheless, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that West American actually
attempted an execution against Hiatt that was returned
unsatisfied. Because an unsatisfied attempt to execute
on a judgment against an insured is a prerequisite
element of West American's right to pursue a direct
action against Nationwide, we remand to the trial court
for a finding on this issue.
Speros v. Fricke. 2004 UT 69, U 55.
Stated differently, the Jensen I court's determination that Davis County
did not have a contract claim directly against Progressive can be explained by
the general rule in equity that the existence of a right of action at law prevents
jurisdiction in the chancery court. Since Davis County's cause of action had

10

The Jensen I panel's holding that since there was no right under the
contract, "therefore," there was no equitable right would be clear error were it
not for the harmony provided by Section 201. The absence of a legal right was
a condition precedent to access to equitable relief in the chancery courts.
Satisfaction of the condition precedent necessary for relief in equity cannot
"therefore" result in a denial of equitable relief unless the creditor's bill were a
separate claim at law under Section 201. Since appellate rulings provide gloss
for statutes and statutes are to be interpreted in a manner that is consistent
and not inoperable, an interpretation that renders the holding absurd should
not be presumed. Alternatively, it was mere dicta. Alternatively, more harm
than good would flow from not overruling the statement. "Under the doctrine
of stare decisis, [a court should] follow [its] "own precedents . . . unless [it is]
clearly convinced that the [precedent] was originally erroneous or is no longer
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come
by departing from precedent." State v. Menzies. 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994).
12

not yet accrued at the time of Jensen L it could not have been fully and fairly
litigated. Since it was not fully and fairly litigated, res judicata cannot apply to
this separate action.

C.

The Absence of Standing Prevented Full Litigation

The doctrine of res judicata effects an estoppel against parties. Those
over whom a court acquires jurisdiction may be bound by the decisions reached
by that court as to specific issues and claims. And those decisions will be
conclusive as against those parties in subsequent litigation. See, e.g., Lawlor v.
National Screen Service Corp.. 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955) (under Article III
parties generally may not relitigate an issue that was litigated and actually
decided, and whose resolution was necessary to the prior judgment).
Davis County was not a party because the Utah Court of Appeals ruled
that it lacked "standing." 11 Therefore, Judge Allphin's ruling was vacated by
implication.
Although Davis County was named in the underlying litigation,
Progressive defended that action based on its assertion that Davis County

11

The "standing" ruling is not very clear. There are multiple standing
doctrines: constitutional standing, prudential standing, contractual standing,
etc. And most of these doctrines are only relevant in Article III courts. See
Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983) ("Unlike the federal system, the
judicial power of the state of Utah is not constitutionally restricted by the
language of Article III of the United States Constitution requiring 'cases' and
'controversies,' since no similar requirement exists in the Utah Constitution.
We previously have held that 'this Court may grant standing where matters of
great public interest and societal impact are concerned.' Jenkins v. State,
Utah, 585 P.2d 442, 443 (1978) (footnote omitted). However, the requirement
that the plaintiff have a personal stake in the outcome of a legal dispute is
rooted in the historical and constitutional role of the judiciary in Utah."). The
Utah Court of Appeals conceded Davis County's personal stake in the outcome.
13

lacked "standing" to challenge its conclusions. The Utah Court of Appeals
agreed with that contention.
The Jensen court ruled: "The County cannot bring a cause of action in
contract directly against Progressive." Jensen, 2003 UT App 444,1119 n. 7, 83
P.3d 405; See, e.g., Stolberg v. Members of Bd. of Trustees for State Colleges.
541 F.2d 890 (2d Cir.1976) (holding that where the district court had expressly
refused to consider an issue in an earlier contract litigation, plaintiff was not
precluded from arguing the issue in a subsequent proceeding between the same
parties). Since the County was barred from bringing a claim against
Progressive at that time, it cannot be estopped from challenging Progressive's
interpretation of its policy in this separate litigation.

D.

The Appellate Opinion Is Only Authority for What it
Actually Decided

The Utah Court of Appeals held that Judge Allphin's court lacked
jurisdiction to decide arguments provided by Davis County. Since Judge
Allphin's court lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits as a result of the
"standing" determination, any opinions from that court cannot support a
finding ofres judicata.

The appellate opinion supplanted the trial court's

opinion in the same way an amended complaint supplants the original
complaint.
Our principal difficulty with this ruling is that the St. Pierre
I summary judgment dismissed St. Pierre's original claims
not on their merits but only for lack of Article III standing.
See St.Pierrel, 1993 WL 85757, at *3 (granting defendants'
motions which were "tantamount to a challenge to plaintiffs'
standing to maintain this action"); St. Pierre II, 28 F.3d at
275 ("[i]n a thorough opinion, the [St.Pierre i] court granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendants appellees on
14

the basis that St. Pierre lacked standing because the
proceeds of the lapsed policy were payable not to St. Pierre,
but rather to Kenworth and another"); id, at 276
("affirm[ing] substantially for the reasons stated in the
opinion of the district court"); St, Pierre HI, 21 F.Supp.2d at
140 (noting that the St, Pierre I court "granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the ground that because the
proceeds of the insurance policy were payable to Kenworth
rather than to St. Pierre, St. Pierre lacked standing to
maintain the action"). Since a dismissal for lack of Article III
standing is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
see, e.g., Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co,, 72 F.3d 1085,
1091 (2d Cir. 1995); Thompson v. County of Franklin, 15
F.3d at 247-49, the St^Pierrel judgment has no res
judicata effect with respect to most of St.Pierre's claims.
St. Pierre and Que-Van Transport v. Dver. 208 F.3d 394, 400 (2nd Cir. 1999)
(bold added).

E,

The Appellate Opinion Supplanted Judge Allphin's Ruling

The decision by Judge Allphin was implicitly vacated because the Court
of Appeals refused to recognize Davis County's standing.
The view that an appeal creates a clean slate, so to speak, for
purposes of res judicata, upon which the appellate court's
grounds of decision are inscribed, has been said to be
supported by "the great weight [ ] of judicial and scholarly
opinion." Hannahville Indian Community v. United States,
180 Ct.CL 477, 485 (1967).

12

"A finding of the trial court not passed upon by an appellate court
because it was unnecessary for the appellate court's decision does not leave
that finding res judicata between the parties. See e,g., Moran Towing &
Transportation Co, v, Navigazione Liberia Triestina, 92 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1937),
cert, denied, 302 U.S. 744, 58 S.Ct. 145, 82 L.Ed. 575 (1937); Reighley v.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co, of Chicago, 323 Ill.App. 479, 56
N.E.2d 328 (1944); State v. Missouri Public Service Corp., 351 Mo. 961, 174
S.W.2d 871 (1948), cert, denied 321 U.S. 793, 64 S.Ct. 786, 88 L.Ed. 1082
(1944); Spreyer, Inc, v, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co,, 222 Pa.Super. 261, 295
A.2d 143 (1972); Sterling National Bank & Trust Co, of New York v.
Charleston Transit Co,, 126 W.Va. 42, 27 S.E.2d 256 (1943), cert, denied 321
U.S. 777, 64 S.Ct. 619, 88 L.Ed. 1071 (1944)." Nodland v. NokotaCo.. 314
N.W.2d 89, 92 (N.D. 1981).
15

Spever. Inc. v. Goodvear Tire and Rubber Co. 295 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. 1972).
The Jensen I court did not intend to both refuse to provide Davis County
with a forum to have its dispute heard while simultaneously intending that
Davis County would be bound by any determination in that litigation as a
consequence of "standing."
The bases for this rule are easy to discern. First, it is felt
that, properly speaking, there is only one judgment in a case
— the ultimate judgment, which is that of the appellate
court. Second, it is clear that an appellate court's refusal to
rest its affirmance on a certain finding is often indicative of
an infirmity in the finding. Third, it has been held that to
consider a party bound in later actions by a trial court's
determination which was ignored on appeal is to deprive the
party of a [constitutional13] right of appeal. And fourth, it
would seem that a contrary rule would require considerable
wariness on the part of an appellate court, in disposing of a
case, lest it inadvertently leave questionable findings res
judicata.
Id. (citations omitted).
Even if the Jensen I decision were final in a procedural sense, Davis
County still must have had a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue for
collateral estoppel to apply. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa
NavieraSantaS.A., 56 F.3d 359, 368 (2d Cir.1995) (identifying a full and fair
opportunity to litigate as one of several elements that must be met before
collateral estoppel precludes further litigation).
This action is brought to obtain money held by Progressive that belongs
to Davis County. Progressive owes money to Jensen. It owes money to Jensen
because it promised to indemnify him for his legal liability. And Jensen's legal
liability was determined by the trial court's entry of a judgment against him for

Utah Const. Art. VIII, § 5.
16

$17,209.88.14
While it is true that Judge Allphin ruled that Progressive did not owe
Jensen any money, that ruling did not survive the appeal. The Utah Court of
Appeals held that the County could never obtain a decision on the merits.
Jensen at 1118. It held that no cause of action existed when it used the inapt
phrase "standing." Since no cause of action was determined to have been at
issue, the "merits" were not reached. Reaching the merits is another element
of both branches of res judicata which fails..

IV.

DAVIS COUNTY PROPERLY BROUGHT THIS
SEPARATE CAUSE OF ACTION AND SATISFIED THE
PREREQUISITE TO ACCRUAL OF ITS CLAIM.

Section 201 must be read together with Section 202. And both sections
should be read in the context of the rules of equity and the legislative purpose
underlying mandatory automobile insurance. See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 68-32 (when there is a conflict between common law and equity "the rules of equity
shall prevail.").

A.

The Statutory Prerequisite Was Satisfied

The statutory prerequisite was satisfied by Davis County's inability to
locate Jensen.

14

See Dyer, 208 F.3d at 401-02 ("The district court apparently did not
conclude that St.Pierre failed to meet the first of these criteria; nor could it
reasonably have so concluded, for St.Pierre is subject to a judgment requiring
him to pay American Iron more than $100,000-an injury that is concrete,
particular, and actual. Nor could the court properly have concluded, with
respect to the third criterion, that the injury would not be redressed by a
favorable decision on St.Pierre's complaint, for the complaint sought, inter alia,
a monetary award to St.Pierre in the amount of the judgment against him.").
17

But, after all, the judgment and fruitless execution are only
evidence that his legal remedies have been exhausted, or
that he is without remedy at law. They are not the only
possible means of proof. The necessity of resort to a court of
equity may be made otherwise to appear. Accordingly the
rule, though general, is not without many exceptions.
Neither law nor equity requires a meaningless form, 'Bona,
sed impossibilia non cogit lex' It has been decided that
where it appears by the bill that the debtor is insolvent and
that the issuing of an execution would be of no practical
utility, the issue of an execution is not a necessary
prerequisite to equitable interference. Turner v. Adams, 46
Mo. 95; Postlewait & Creagan and Keeler v. Howes, 3 Iowa,
365; Ticonie Bank v. Harvey, 16 id. 141; Botsford v. Beers, 11
Conn. 369; Payne v. Sheldon, 63 Barb (N. Y.) 169. This is
certainly true where the creditor has a lien or a trust in his
favor.
So it has been held that a creditor, without having first
obtained a judgment at law, may come into a court of equity
to set aside fraudulent conveyances of his debtor, made for
the purpose of hindering and delaying creditors, and to
subject the property to the payment of the debt due him.
Thurmond and Others v. Reese, 3 Ga. 449; Cornell v.
Radway, 22 Wis. 260; Sanderson v. Stockdale, 11 Md. 563.
Case v. Beauregard, 101 U.S. 688, 25 L.Ed. 1004 (1879).

B,

The Statute at Issue Arose out of Equity

The statute providing that an insurance company cannot avoid its
obligations is intended to provide a mechanism for prompt reimbursement to
victims, to aid in the proper administration of the insurance statutes, and to
explicitly adopt equitable principles to promote, rather than to defeat, the
interests of justice. "The rule requiring a judgment was a product, not just of
the procedural requirement that remedies at law had to be exhausted before
equitable remedies could be pursued, but also of the substantive rule that a
general creditor (one without a judgment) had no cognizable interest, either at
law or in equity, in the property of his debtor, and therefore could not interfere
18

with the debtor's use of that property." Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v
Alliance Bond Fund, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999).
The phrase, "execution returned unsatisfied"15 is merely an
admonishment that courts of chancery will not ordinarily exercise their powers
if courts of law are available to provide a remedy.
This matter is properly characterized as an action "quasi in rem'' It is a
dispute over the status and ownership of funds held by Progressive. It can also
be described as an equitable lien.
In the language of chancery courts, this action is a creditor's bill16 — a
15

The phrase is used in common law garnishment which required
execution prior to garnishment in aid of execution, principal-surety law,
bankruptcy law, receivership law, fraudulent conveyances and many other
areas of the law. See, ^g,, Buttles v. Smith. 281 N.Y. 226, 22 N.E.2d 350, 353
(1939) ("Where an action is brought under * * * section 15 of the Stock
Corporation Law, no cause of action accrues to a creditor [of the
corporation] until judgment has been obtained and execution returned
unsatisfied."); Cortez v. Vogt 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 841, 853, 52 Cal.App.4th 917, 936
(Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1997) (" ... [T]his statute simply abrogates 'the ancient rule
whereby a judgment and a lien were essential preliminaries to equitable relief
against a fraudulent conveyance', and that what it 'seeks' is to level
'distinctions that at times had been the refuge of the dilatory debtor.' American
Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 7, 166 N.E. 783, 785, 65 A.L.R. 244. After all,
the fraudulent grantor cannot complain, for as to him the obligation is a
subsisting one until the statutory period has run against the judgment. As to
his grantee, who holds only an apparent title, a mere cloak under which is
hidden the hideous skeleton of deceit, the real owner being the scheming and
shifty judgment debtor,-what reason has he to complain when the six year
statute giving repose to the remedy has not expired since entry of judgment?").
16

"A creditor's suit is an equitable action to satisfy a judgment 'out of
the equitable assets of the debtor which could not be reached on execution.'
Wadsworth v. Schisselbaur, 32 Minn. 84, 86, 19 N.W. 390, 390 (1884). A
creditor's suit is 'in essence an equitable execution comparable to proceedings
supplementary to execution.' Pierce v. United States, 255 U.S. 398, 401-402, 41
S.Ct. 365, 65 L.Ed. 697 (1921) (citation omitted). The general rule in
Minnesota is that a creditor is: required first to exhaust his remedy at law by
the issuance of an execution and its return unsatisfied, for until then the
remedy at law had not been shown to be inadequate, hind v. O.N. Johnson Co.,
204 Minn. 30, 37, 282 N.W. 661, 666 (1938) (citing Moffatt v. Tuttle, 35 Minn.
301, 28 N.W. 509 (1886))." Brakemeier v. Wittek. 386 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. App.
19

suit to enforce an equitable claim to property. From the moment that
execution has been returned unsatisfied, the judgment creditor has a claim to
the equitable assets of the judgment debtor. Utah Coop. Ass'n v. White
Distrib. & Supply Co.. 2 Utah 2d 391, 275 P.2d 687 (Utah 1954) ("Equity will
not permit him to thus unjustly enrich himself, but will impose a constructive
trust upon his interest in the property to protect the White Corporation, and
its creditor, the plaintiff, which stands in its shoes.").
The Utah statute provides that a new cause of action accrues subsequent
to the entry of the judgment against the judgment debtor and fruitless
execution. This new cause of action was not addressed much less resolved.
A judgment creditor's claim is not merely one in personam against the
debtor; he had that claim before judgment. He has a claim quasi in rem
against such things as surplus trust income and any other property not subject
to execution at law, which claim he may assert and enforce by creditor's bill.17
Whatever logical or historical distinctions separate the
jurisdictions of equity and law, and with whatever effect
those distinctions may be supposed to be recognized in the
Constitution, we are not of opinion that the proceeding in
question partakes so exclusively of the nature of either that
it may not be authorized, indifferently, as an instrument of
justice in the hands of courts of whatever description.
Ex parte Bovd. 105 U.S. 647, 658, 26 L.Ed. 1200 (1881).

1986).
17

Miller v. Sherry. 2 Wall. 237, 69 U.S. 237, 245, 17 L.Ed. 827 (1864)
("Under the rule, thus interpreted, all parties can obtain their rights, when
fixed, without conflict, and in a manner least expensive, and according to sound
principles of equity.").
20

C,

Equity Will Not Permit Procedural Disputes to
Thwart Justice

It is an accepted maxim that equity "looks beneath the rigid rules of the
law to seek substantial justice. It has the power to prevent such rules from
working an injustice, and will depart therefrom whenever it is necessary to
accomplish the ends of justice." 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89. Toward that end, the
condition precedent that an execution be returned unsatisfied has easily been
satisfied by Davis County.
In short, the evidence was overwhelming that the insured
was judgment proof. Nonetheless, appellee points out that
appellants "did not file any documents with respect to
attempting to satisfy the judgment." Under these
circumstances, however, the evidence was conclusive that to
do so would have been an exercise in futility, as well as a
monumental waste of money. This evidence of total
insolvency, in our view, is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement that the judgment against the insured must be
returned unsatisfied, or that the insured must refuse to pay
it, before the injured party may directly sue the insurer.
Woodfm Equities Corp. v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Md.App. 616, 638 (Md.
App. 1995). Utah law is in accord with the principles articulated by the
Maryland court.
It is no doubt generally true that a creditor's bill to subject
his debtor's interests in property to the payment of the debt
must show that all remedy at law had been exhausted. And
generally, it must be averred that judgment has been
recovered for the debt; that execution has been issued, and
that it has been returned nulla bona. The reason is that
until such a showing is made, it does not appear, in most
cases, that resort to a court of equity is necessary, or in other
words, that the creditor is remediless at law. In some cases,
also, such an averment is necessary to show that the creditor
has a lien upon the property he seeks to subject to the
payment of his demand. The rule is a familiar one, that a
court of equity will not entertain a case for relief where the
complainant has an adequate legal remedy. The complaining
party must, therefore, show that he had done all that he
could do at law to obtain his rights.
21

Case v. Beauregard. 101 U.S. 688, 25 L.Ed. 1004 (1879).
Judge Learned Hand explained how equitable authority is properly
applied to the condition of a return nulla bona.
In the case at bar the supplemental bill alleged that the
Practical Company had been left an "empty shell." This was
not proved, because, for all that appeared, it had accounts
receivable which made it solvent. On the other hand, all
property leviable by execution had been conveyed, for in New
York choses in action can still be reached only by bill in
equity ("supplementary proceedings"). McNeeley v. Welz, 166
N. Y. 124, 59 N. E. 697. It appears to us unnecessary to
go to the extreme of the New York decisions, and say
that execution and a return nulla bona are
conditions, w h e n it appears that all the debtor's
property which could be reached by the writ had
already b e e n conveyed. U. S. v. Fairall (D. C.) 16 F.(2d)
328; Bird v. Murphy, 72 Cal. App. 39, 236 P. 154; O'Brien v.
Stambach, 101 Iowa, 40, 69 N. W. 1133, 63 Am. St. Rep. 368;
Balsley v. Union Cypress Co. (Fla.) 110 So. 263; Rice v.
McJohn, 244 111. 264, 91 N. E. 448. Being free to decide in
accordance with what seem to us the general equitable
principles controlling, we cannot see why we should insist
upon what would have been an idle gesture.
Empire Lighting Fixture Co. v. Practical Lighting Fixture Co.. 20 F.2d 295, 297
(2nd Cir. 1927).18
A Utah court entered a judgment in favor of Davis County on the merits,

18

See id. at pp. 296-97 ("A fraudulent conveyance is void under the New
York statute, and may be disregarded, even by a creditor whose judgment is
entered afterwards. Chautauque Bank v. Risley, 19 N. Y. 369, 75 Am. Dec. 347;
Bergen v. Carman, 79 N. Y. 146; Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568, 31 N. E. 1082. A
suit to set it aside is not therefore essential, but is only an alternative remedy.
It clears the title of the creditor in limine, and is in aid of the principal purpose
of the suit; it "is in substance an equitable execution." Dewey v. West Fairmont
Gas Coal Co., 123 U. S. 329, 333, 8 S. Ct. 148, 31 L. Ed. 179; Hobbs v. Gooding
(C. C.) 164 F. 91; Id., 176 F. 259 (C. C. A. 1). Cook v. Beecher (C. C.) 172 F. 166,
affirmed 217 U. S. 497, 30 S. Ct. 601, 54 L. Ed. 855, was quite another case.
There the plaintiff tried to hold the directors of a company upon their liability
as such for a judgment rendered against it. Such a liability is not an
incident to the collection of the judgment itself, but an independent
cause of action.").
22

and execution has been "returned unsatisfied" because Jensen cannot be
found. (R. 73). The judgment debtor has equitable assets of considerable value
located within the jurisdiction of this Court. But Progressive argues that the
judgment debtor, by removing himself from the state or remaining hidden, can
baffle the judgment creditor and render the court powerless to enforce its own
judgment. If this argument is tenable, it is a reproach to our system of
administering justice.
Moreover, it is contrary to fundamental principles guiding courts of
equity. "Courts of equity are to do equity and compel fair dealing; they are not
to aid in clever attempts to escape just obligations." 30 C.J.S. Equity, § 89 at n.
39.
D.

The Money Held by Progressive Is Held in a Constructive
Trust

Progressive has held money since 1998 that is the rightful property of
Davis County. Progressive has held these funds in a constructive trust.
Progressive has managed to hold this property for its own benefit because of its
refusal to defend its insured and its failure to come with clean hands into this
Court. 19 By refusing to defend Jensen, Progressive rendered this litigation
more difficult and expensive. It also has erected artificial barriers to the

19

See Lieber v. ITT Hartford Insurance Ctr.. 2000 UT 72,1119 ("an
insurer is obliged to assess the black-letter law in the jurisdiction in which the
claim arises, and to act accordingly. This obligation to properly assess the
law extends to the legal assertions a party and its counsel make in
litigation."); Smith v. American Family Ins. Co.. 294 N.W.2d 751, 760 (N.D.
1980) (holding that post-disclaimer threat by insurer to sue insured's counsel
for abuse of process is admissible in action regarding "handling [of the] claim");
Soblev v. Southern Natural Gas Co.. 302 F.3d 325, 329 (5 th Cir. 2002)
(explaining that all insurers operate under a continuing duty to
periodically reevaluate claims denials).
23

administration of justice through the breach of its fiduciary obligation to
defend its insured. These actions epitomize bad faith.
Its actions, if affirmed, would reward unfair dealing rather than
compelling fair dealing. A court of equity will not allow itself to be used for
unjust purposes.
Moreover, the holder of property in a constructive trust is subject to the
same duties owed by any other trustee. To wit, Progressive owes duties of
competence and honesty. It also owes a duty to refrain from self-dealing.
Progressive should be removed as constructive trustee ex maleficio. 90
C.J.S. Trusts § 232. It has refused to follow the instructions inherent in the
trust — that it honor the judgment of Second District Court. Id, It has
displayed animosity and hostility toward the beneficiary of the trust by its
refusal to perform and by escalating the litigation necessary to collect the sums
it holds. L i And it has attempted to disclaim the existence of the trust and the
equitable ownership of the money held in trust for the purpose of satisfying
Davis County's judgment against its insured, Jensen. I d
E.

Progressive's Policy Unquestionably Provided Coverage
for J e n s e n

Progressive attempts to draw a distinction between Judge Allphin's
interpretation of the term "accident" and the intentional acts exclusion. Its
conclusion is without merit. However, some of its contentions leading to its
conclusion are not wholly without merit under other, different circumstances.
Therefore, some insurance law background is appropriate.
The insuring clause of an insurance policy describes the covered

24

property 20 or covered peril21 to which coverage may attach. An exception may
reduce the breadth of the coverage described by the insuring clause. The
coverage clause describes the scope of coverage to be provided by the insurer
upon the happening of an event or condition described in the insuring clause.
And an exclusion is an event or condition that may preclude the application of
the coverage obligations despite the loss otherwise coming within the general
purview of the described covered peril or covered property.
Progressive's error arises from its failure to understand the definition of
the covered peril contained in UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-303. Utah's
insurance code does not limit coverage to what Progressive calls an "accident."
The definition set forth in Section 303 describing the covered perils is a
requirement which is binding upon all insurance companies doing business in
Utah. IcL; compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-302 (imposing criminal
sanctions, a class B misdemeanor, for any motorist's failure to purchase
insurance); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-31-103(3) (stating that an insurance
company commits insurance fraud when inter alia it withholds information or
provides false or misleading information in connection with an insurance
claim).
The Utah Supreme Court correctly determined that the covered perils
required under Section 303 include an insured's "legal liability" without regard
to how or why that legal liability accrued (i.e., coverage for all perils). The only
20

For example, collision coverage is a covered property policy.
Therefore, coverage follows the property.
21

The Progressive coverage at issue is its PD liability coverage. This is a
covered peril coverage. Therefore, coverage follows the person. Vehicles
cannot owe or breach any legal duties — only people can be subject to the peril
against which this coverage provides protection.
25

condition (i.e., exception) is that the liability must have accrued in connection
with the ownership, use or maintenance of an automobile.
In the case of an owner's liability policy, the statute requires
that the policy insure the person named in the policy and
any permissive users "against loss from the liability imposed
by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles within the
United States and Canada . . . in [dollar] amounts not less
than the minimum limits specified." Id. §
31A-22-303(l)(a)(ii) (emphasis added).
1f43 The statute recognizes no distinction between
liability arising out of negligent acts and liability
arising out of intentional acts; it simply requires
coverage for all liabilities imposed by law. Because the
law imposes liability for damages caused negligently and
intentionally, we conclude that the statute requires coverage
of liability arising out of intentional, as well as negligent,
acts.
Speros v. Fricke. 2004 UT 69,1111 42-43, 98 P.3d 28.

F.

Determination of Progressive's Contractual Liability is
Ripe

Plaintiff could not, under UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-201, bring an action
against Progressive until its cause of action as a judgment creditor accrued.
Since the cause of action did not accrue until after entry of judgment and
return of judgment unsatisfied, the prior ruling of Judge Allphin can have no
preclusive effect.

26

CONCLUSION
The district court's order should be reversed. This Court's remand order
should direct the district court as follows: The district court shall immediately
and without additional delay enter a judgment directing Progressive to pay the
sum of $25,814.82 to Davis County.
DATED this / p

day of February, 2008.
CARR & WADDOUPS

^ENTXWADDOI^S

_Attorneys for Plaintiff / Appellant
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PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTER

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

f

DAVIS COUNTY,

i

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
PROGRESSIVE NORTHWESTERN INSURANCE
CO., AS THE INSURER OF JAMES JENSEN,
JUDGMENT DEBTOR,

Civil No. 060904637
Judge Stephen L. Henriod

Defendant.

The Court heard oral arguments on the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
and the plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on September 14, 2007. The
plaintiff was represented by Trent J. Waddoups. The defendant was represented by
Joseph J. Joyce.

Having considered the parties' oral arguments, and having carefully

reviewed and considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court does hereby
make the following ORDER:

1.

Davis County lacks standing to bring a direct cause of action against

Progressive under Utah §31A-22-201 because it has not made an attempt to execute
judgment that has been returned unsatisfied.
2.

Davis County's claim that Progressive must provide insurance coverage for

Jensen's conduct is barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion
because Davis County was a party to the prior adjudication; the issue of Jensen's
insurance coverage was decided in the prior adjudication; the issue of Jensen's insurance
coverage was completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and the first suit resulted in a final
judgment on the merits.
' ORDER
Wherefore, the Court does hereby GRANT the defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and DENY the plaintiffs Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, and does further
ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE that the plaintiffs complaint against the defendant be
and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice, upon the merits, with no costs awarded.
DATED this

*J

day of

/Hw^uVt--

, 2007.
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Davis County,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
James M. Jensen and Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co.,
Defendants and Appellees.
OPINION
(For Official Publication)
Case No. 20030174-CA
F I L E D
(December 26, 2003)
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444

Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable Michael G. Allphin
Attorneys: Trent J. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Kristin A. Van Orman, James D. Franckowiak, and Joseph J. Joyce, Salt
Lake City, for Appellees

Before Judges Jackson, Billings, and Greenwood.
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
11 Davis County appeals the district court's order granting summary
judgment in favor of Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company. We
affirm.

rage z-uio
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BACKGROUND
12 On June 20, 1998, James Jensen led police on a high-speed
automobile chase. During the pursuit, Jensen, driving southbound on
Interstate 15, attempted to cross the median into oncoming northbound
traffic. Worried for the safety of other drivers, Sergeant Gleave of
the Davis County Sheriff's Office maneuvered his cruiser along the
driver-side of Jensen's vehicle, effectively blocking Jensen's
intended path into the opposing traffic flow. Unfazed, Jensen
continued toward the median until his vehicle impacted the passenger
side of Sergeant Gleave's cruiser. Jensen's attempts to push the
heavier cruiser out of the way proved unsuccessful, and Sergeant
Gleave began pushing Jensen's car toward the right shoulder of the
southbound lane. At this point, Jensen abruptly disengaged. The
sudden lack of resistance caused Sergeant Gleave to lose control of
his cruiser and collide with a semitrailer truck. The cruiser was
deemed a total loss by insurance adjusters. Jensen later pleaded
guilty to charges of aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and
failure to stop at the command of a police officer.
13 At the time of the incident, Jensen was covered as a permissive
user under an automobile insurance policy (the Policy) with
Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company (Progressive). Davis
County (the County)*1* filed a claim with Progressive for damages to
the police cruiser. Progressive determined that Jensen's conduct was
intentional, not accidental, and therefore was not covered under the
Policy. i ^ 1
14 After Progressive denied the claim, the County filed a negligence
suit against Jensen and Progressive seeking to recover damages.
Because Progressive believed Jensen's intentional criminal conduct
excluded him from coverage under the Policy, Progressive did not
provide a defense for Jensen. When Jensen failed to provide his own
defense, the trial court entered a default judgment against him in
the amount of $17,209.88.
15 Thereafter, both Progressive and the County filed motions for
summary judgment. Progressive argued it was entitled to summary
judgment because the County had no standing to sue Progressive and
because Jensen's intentional conduct was outside the scope of
coverage, relieving Progressive of any duty to indemnify or defend
Jensen. The County argued it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law because the default judgment against Jensen conclusively
established the factual allegations of negligence in the complaint,
leaving Jensen's conduct squarely within the scope of coverage.
Hence, the County argued that both the fact and the amount of
Progressive's liability were conclusively established. The trial
court denied the County's motion for summary judgment and granted
Progressive's motion for summary judgment after concluding that
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Progressive had no duty to indemnify or defend because Jensen's
conduct placed him outside the scope of coverage under the Policy.
The County appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
16 The County argues the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Progressive and denying the County judgment as a matter
of law. "Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co.,
2002 UT 68,114, 56 P.3d 524 (quotations and citations omitted). "When
reviewing the trial court's order granting [Progressive's] summary
judgment motion, we view the facts and reasonable factual inferences
in the light most favorable to [the County], the nonmoving party."
Id. We review the order granting summary judgment for correctness,
according no deference to the district court's legal conclusions. Id.
ANALYSIS
17 The County argues the trial court erred in granting Progressive
judgment as a matter of law. We disagree but affirm on the alternate
ground of standing.-^~
18 Progressive argued below and now contends on appeal that the
County lacks standing to bring this direct action against
Progressive.* ^ We agree with Progressive.
19 The County relies on State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Northwestern National Insurance Co., 912 P.2d 983 (Utah 1996), for
the proposition that one insurer may bring a subrogation action
against a second insurer. In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co., our supreme court noted:
Utah law clearly recognizes an insurer's right to bring a subrogation
action on behalf of its insured against a tortfeasor . . . . More
significantly, we have extended this principle to an action by an
insurer against a second insurance company which is primarily liable
to defend or pay any claims on behalf of its insured but which has
denied coverage.
Id. at 985. We conclude the County has read this language too
broadly.
110 The plaintiff in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. filed
suit following an automobile accident involving Dalton, an employee
of Dave's Texaco. See id. at 984. The accident resulted in personal
injuries to the plaintiff and property damage to both the plaintiff's
vehicle and the one Dalton was driving. See id. At the time of the
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accident, Dalton was driving a vehicle he had borrowed from Puffer,
his supervisor at Dave's Texaco, See id. Puffer carried an automobile
insurance policy with State Farm, and Dalton was covered under that
policy as a permissive user of Puffer's vehicle. See id. Northwestern
National insured Dave's Texaco and, due to his status as an employee,
Dalton was also covered under that policy. See id. Hence, Dalton's
claims of coverage under both policies arose from contractual
relationships between the insurers and the insured. See id. For
reasons immaterial here, both State Farm and Northwestern denied
Dalton coverage. See id. at 984-85. However, State Farm, acting to
protect its insured, ultimately investigated and settled all claims.
See id. at 985. Thereafter, State Farm sued Northwestern on the
equitable grounds of subrogation, indemnification, and unjust
enrichment, arguing Northwestern was obligated to pay the claims. See
id. On these facts, the supreme court could "find no merit in
Northwestern's argument that State Farm should be foreclosed from
bringing a subrogation action because State Farm disputed coverage
under its policy with Puffer." Id. at 986-87. Thus, the supreme court
held that where two insurers, each having separate contractual
obligations to cover the same tortfeasor, are in disagreement as to
which insurer is primarily liable, the insurer that pays the claim to
protect its insured may bring an equitable subrogation action against
the second insurer .-*-—'- See id. ; see also National Farmers Union Prop.
& Cas. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 14 Utah 2d 89, 377 P.2d 786, 787
(1963) (allowing one insurer to bring a subrogation action against a
second insurer to determine primary liability in an accident caused
by a person that both companies had contracted to insure). The
County's position finds no support in this holding because the County
had no contractual relationship with Progressive or with Jensen and,
therefore, no equitable right to subrogation against Progressive
under the Policy.
Ill Other Utah case law is in direct opposition to the County's claim
of standing. For example, in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah
1979), our supreme court held that an injured party has no direct
cause of action in contract against a tortfeasor's insurer because
the insurer's liability to the injured party "arises only
secondarily, through its contractual arrangement with the
[tortfeasor]." Id. at 1039. In the context of an action for
declaratory judgment, the supreme court in Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Co. v. Chuqg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957), held that "one who
claims to be damaged by the [tortious] act of another" is not "a
proper party to an action by the insurer of the [tortfeasor] under a
public liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgment is sought
declaring the legal effects of the terms of such policy." Id. at 281.
In fact, the supreme court has "consistently held . . . that [a
tortfeasor's] insurer [may] not be joined with the tort-feasor unless
[such was] required by statute." Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Utah 2d
411, 483 P.2d 447, 448 (1971).
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512 Some jurisdictions have adopted so-called "direct action
statutes," allowing an injured party to bring direct action against a
tortfeasor's insurer. See 7 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on
Insurance 3d. § 104:13 (1997) (citing Dewalt v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 99 F.2d 846 (8th Cir. 1938); Jackson v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 23 So. 2d 765 (La. Ct. App. 1945), rev'd on other
grounds, 29 So. 2d 177 (La. 1946); Thrasher v. United States Liab.
Ins. Co., 225 N.E.2d 503 (N.Y. 1967); Fehr v. General Accident Fire &
Life Assurance Corp., 16 N.W.2d 787 (Wis. 1944)).
113 However, Utah has not adopted this rule. Instead, Utah adheres to
the "general rule, [that] in the absence of a contractual provision
or a statute or ordinance to the contrary, . . . the absence of
privity of contract between the [injured party] and the
[tortfeasor's] insurer bars a direct action by the [injured party]
against the [insurer]" in automobile insurance cases. Id. § 104:2
(footnotes omitted); see also Campbell, 596 P.2d at 1039 ("In Utah, a
plaintiff must direct his action against the actual tortfeasor, not
the insurer.").
114 At least two policy justifications are provided in Utah case law
for not adopting a direct action rule in Utah. First, "the presence
of an insurer as a party defendant [with the tortfeasor] might have
the same effect upon the jury as . . . a liability policy,"
Christensen, 483 P.2d at 448, namely that the jury may improperly
employ considerations of insurance, as evidenced by the presence of
an insurer in the litigation, to decide the merits of a case. See
Young v. Barney, 20 Utah 2d 108, 433 P.2d 846, 848 (1967) ("The
understanding has always been that it [i]s prejudicial error to
deliberately inject insurance [information] into . . . a trial.").
Second, "[i]t is not the policy of the law to encourage litigation."
Ammerman v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576, 578
(1967) .
115 Further, the County lacks standing to bring an action in tort
against Progressive because Progressive "has committed no act making
it liable in tort to [the County]." Campbell, 596 P.2d at 1039.
Indeed, the County does not allege that Progressive committed
tortious acts against the County.^^ The County's only cause of action
in tort lies against Jensen, see id., and the County has already
obtained a default judgment against him.
516 The County's claim of standing as a third-party beneficiary is
also unavailing. The facts of the cases upon which the County relies
for support of its claimed right to recover as a third-party
beneficiary are distinguishable from the facts of this case, and
neither holding controls. In Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429
P. 2d 39 (1967), the supreme court granted an interlocutory appeal to
review a ruling of the trial court "that the defendant in a personal
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injury action must answer in discovery whether she is insured, and if
so, the name of the insurer and the amount of coverage." Id. at 3940. The court held that because the injured party is
in effect a third-party beneficiary of the insurance of a wrongdoer
who injures him, . . . [i]t is only reasonable that the plaintiff
should have some means of discovering whether a policy exists, and
what its provisions are so he can know whether covenants upon which
his rights may depend are being complied with.
Id. at 41. A plain reading shows that the court's holding applies
only to the narrow issue of cooperation in discovery. The court did
not hold, as the County asserts here, that injured third parties have
a right of direct action against the tortfeasor's insurer.
117 In Peterson v. Western Casualty & Surety Co., 19 Utah 2d 26, 425
P. 2d 769 (1967), the insurance policy in question "contained the
usual provision that a judgment creditor of the insured may bring"
suit directly against the tortfeasor's insurer. Id. at 770. Hence,
the Peterson holding, which allowed a plaintiff to recover directly
from the tortfeasor's insurer, came about because the insurer
consented to such action in the language of the policy. See id. at
770, 772.
118 That the County may never collect on its judgment against Jensen
is unfortunate; but until the Utah Legislature sees fit to adopt a
rule allowing direct action by an injured party against a
tortfeasor's insurer, the County has no right of action against
Progressive directly, and no means to impel Jensen to obtain a
settlement from Progressive in order to satisfy its judgment. See
Ammerman, 430 P.2d at 578 ("The privilege of deciding whether to [sue
one's insurer] should be up to [the tortfeasor] and not up to some
third party to inject his interest into the matter.") .-^7^
CONCLUSION
119 The County cannot bring a cause of action in contract directly
against Progressive. Also, the County has no means to force Jensen to
bring a claim against his insurer. Finally, the County has no tort
claim against Progressive because Progressive has committed no
tortious act against the County. Accordingly, we hold that the County
lacks standing to bring its claims against Progressive and,
therefore, we affirm the lower court's grant of summary judgement for
Progressive and its denial of summary judgment for the County.

Judith M. Billings,
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Associate Presiding Judge

12 0 WE CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson,
Presiding Judge

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
1. The County's brief indicates that Utah Association of Counties
Insurance Mutual is the County's insurer and the real party in
interest in this case.
2. The Policy defined an "accident" as "a sudden, unexpected, and
unintended occurrence." The Policy also contained an intentional acts
exclusion clause that excluded coverage for damages caused "by an
intentional act of an insured person[.]"
3. "It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the
judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or
theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory
differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its
ruling or action . . . .'" Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,110, 52 P.3d
1158 (citation omitted).
4. In a prior motion for summary judgment, which the trial court
denied, Progressive argued (thereby preserving the argument for
appeal) that the County lacked standing to bring its claims against
Progressive.
5. The supreme court cautioned that
before a court will grant relief, a party must meet the following
requirements: (1) There must be a debt or obligation for which the
subrogee was not primarily liable; (2) the subrogee must have made
payment to protect his own rights or interest; (3) the subrogee must
not have acted merely as a volunteer; and (4) the entire debt must
have been paid . . . . Furthermore, subrogation must not work any
injustice to the rights of others.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Nat'1 Ins. Co., 912
P.2d 983, 986 (Utah 1996).
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6. The supreme court in Campbell v. Stagg, 596 P.2d 1037 (Utah 1979),
cited the Texas case, Pattison v. Highway Insurance Underwriters, 278
S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), as an example of the kind of tort a
tortfeasor's insurer might commit against the injured party so as to
create a direct action in tort by the injured party against the
insurer. See id. at 1040. There, "plaintiffs alleged the insurer's
agents fraudulently misrepresented the amount of coverage provided in
the defendant's insurance policy, [thereby] inducing plaintiffs to
sign a release agreement." Id. The County has not alleged any such
tort by Progressive in this case.
7. Because our holding that the County lacks standing to bring its
claims against Progressive is dispositive, we do not reach the other
issues raised by the County on appeal.

